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ESSAY
PENN  CENTRAL  TAKE  TWO
Christopher Serkin*
ABSTRACT
Penn Central v. New York City is the most important regulatory takings case of all time.
There, the Supreme Court upheld the historic preservation of Grand Central Terminal in part
because the City offset the burden of the landmarking with a valuable new property interest—a
transferable development right (TDR)—that could be sold to neighboring property.  Extraordina-
rily, 1.2 million square feet of those very same TDRs, still unused for over forty years, are the
subject of newly resolved takings litigation.  According to the complaint, the TDRs that saved
Grand Central were themselves taken by the government, which allegedly wiped out their value by
permissively upzoning neighboring property where they could have been used.  The litigation is
not only a captivating postscript to Penn Central, but also a compelling context for examining
the category of regulatory property more generally.  Regulatory property—such as TDRs and pol-
lution credits, for example—is increasingly important and valuable, but raises complicated
trade-offs between the need for stability in property-based entitlements and policy flexibility in
governance.  This Article ultimately argues that the creation of regulatory property should not
prevent policy changes far into the future.
INTRODUCTION
Without any question, the most important case interpreting the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.1  It involved the historic preservation of Grand Central Terminal, the
majestic railroad terminal in the heart of Manhattan.  With its landmarking,
the City of New York prevented the terminal’s owner—the Penn Central
Authority—from developing a massive high-rise atop the ornate Beaux-Arts
© 2016 Christopher Serkin.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.  I would
like to thank David Schnakenberg for bringing the litigation to my attention and for his
comments, and Nestor Davidson, Rick Hills, John Infranca, Jim Krier, John Nolon, Michael
Pappas, Kevin Stack, Mike Vandenbergh, Katrina Wyman, and Yesha Yadav for comments
on earlier drafts.  I would also like to thank participants at the 2016 Property Works in
Progress Conference at Boston University for their feedback.
1 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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building.  When the Penn Central Authority sued, claiming that the
landmarking was a taking of its valuable development rights, the United
States Supreme Court articulated the eponymous ad hoc three-factor balanc-
ing test and held that the landmarking was not a taking.2  In reaching its
conclusion, the Court focused partly on the fact that the City had enacted a
regime of transferable development rights that allowed the Penn Central
Authority to transfer at least some of the building’s development potential to
its immediate neighbors.3  Now, extraordinarily, 1.2 million square feet of
the very same TDRs from that original landmarking—unused for over forty
years—are back in the news as the subject of a new round of takings litiga-
tion.4  New York City recently relaxed the zoning restrictions in the area
around Grand Central, and in so doing allegedly wiped out much—if not all
of—the value of the remaining unused TDRs.5  The owner of the TDRs sued,
arguing that the City’s favorable treatment of neighboring property was a
taking of the original Penn Central TDRs.6  The case has just been settled on
terms that, while confidential, were characterized as de minimis by knowledge-
able insiders.7  But the poetic injustice of the situation seems striking.  The
TDRs that saved the original landmarking of Grand Central were themselves
allegedly taken through the upzoning of neighboring property.
Even though the case has been resolved, the fact of the litigation raises a
number of important substantive and conceptual issues that go to the heart
of the Takings Clause and the nature of regulatory property.  If the mere
2 Id. at 124 (“The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particu-
larly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of the govern-
mental action.” (citation omitted)).
3 Id. at 137 (“[T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above
the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of even
those pre-existing air rights.  Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they
are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal . . . .”).
4 Complaint ¶ 5, Midtown TDR Ventures LLC v. City of New York, No. 1:15-cv-07647
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Compl.]; see also Charles V. Bagli, Owner of Grand
Central Sues Developer and City for $1.1 Billion Over Air Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/nyregion/owner-of-grand-central-sues-developer-
and-city-for-1-1-billion-over-air-rights.html (describing litigation).
5 Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 10; see also Michael Pappas, A Right to be Regulated?, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (describing litigation); Samantha Peikoff Adler, Note,
Penn Central 2.0: The Takings Implications of Printing Air Rights, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
1120 (same); Tim Cramton, Penn Central’s Revenge, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 3,
2015), http://jlpp.org/blogzine/penn-centrals-revenge/ (same).
6 Compl., supra note 4, ¶¶ 111–18.
7 See Notice of Dismissal, Midtown TDR Ventures LLC v. New York, No. 1:15-cv-07647
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2016); see also Charles V. Bagli, Owners of Grand Central Drop Lawsuit,
Clearing Way for a 1,401-Foot-Tall Skyscraper, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/08/11/nyregion/owners-of-grand-central-drop-lawsuit-clearing-way-for-a-1401-
foot-tall-skyscraper.html (“SL Green paid the investment group a sum, which executives
who had been briefed on the deal but requested anonymity because they were not author-
ized to discuss the details described as ‘de minimis.’”).
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existence of TDRs transforms favorable upzonings into impermissible tak-
ings, then a TDR program threatens to lock in land use regulations against
subsequent regulatory change.  That, in turn, is problematically entrenching
and binds the hands of future governments.8  However, if the value of TDRs
can be so easily undermined, the viability of TDR programs may be in jeop-
ardy.  This Article therefore charts a careful middle path, one that balances
the value of stability in the expectations of rights holders against the need for
policy flexibility in the future.  In particular, it argues that promises of regula-
tory stability should not be implied but should be subject to a clear statement
rule, and that even in the presence of a clear statement, their strength should
decrease over time.
This tension between stability and flexibility is inherent in regulatory
precommitments.  It also explains the complex stakes of the new Penn Central
litigation for developers and preservationists alike, whose natural attitudes
towards the Takings Clause were turned on their ear.  Developers and their
allies generally want looser land use regulations.9  They are inclined to favor
upzonings and regulatory changes that increase development potential.
Indeed, a criticism of TDR regimes from this perspective is that they
encourage governments to enact unduly restrictive zoning ordinances pre-
cisely to enhance the value of the TDRs.10  On the other hand, developer
interests also tend to favor expansive constitutional protection for property
and generally advocate for interpreting the Takings Clause to protect settled
expectations, whatever the source.11  Invoking the Takings Clause to thwart
more permissive land use regulations starkly reveals this tension.
Simultaneously, preservationists and others in favor of broad land use
authority have come to rely on TDRs as an important tool.  New York City
used TDRs to build the innovative High Line Park, for example, and regu-
larly uses TDRs to facilitate historic preservation and other limits on develop-
ment.12  While TDRs are controversial, they serve as a potent lubricant for
8 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Gov-
ernments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011).
9 See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1675 (2013) (“[B]ig
cities allow relatively untrammeled growth because of the political influence of
developers.”).
10 See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land Use Litigation, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2014).
11 See generally WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995); cf. Joseph William
Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations,
30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 312 (2006) (“Conservatives tend to view ownership as embod-
ying both expansive rights and strong protections from government interference.  The
conservative framework sees property and regulation as opposites: broad property rights
mean less regulation and more regulation means less protection for property rights.”).
12 See, e.g., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, UNLOCKING THE RIGHT TO
BUILD: DESIGNING A MORE FLEXIBLE SYSTEM FOR TRANSFERRING DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 7
(2014), http://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_UnlockingtheRighttoBuild.pdf
(describing use of TDRs to preserve theaters in Times Square and the High Line park);
N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, A SURVEY OF TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS MECH-
ANISMS IN NEW YORK CITY 23–25, 47 (2015) (same).  For a selective list demonstrating the
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many regulatory innovations.13  Preservationists therefore could reasonably
worry going forward that the City’s decision to rezone will undermine confi-
dence in TDRs broadly and so reduce or even remove their utility in the
future.  These groups should naturally be inclined to try to protect the value
of the TDRs from the City’s upzoning.  On the other hand, they generally
favor fewer legal protections for private property and a narrower conception
of the Takings Clause.14  There is something ironic about preservationists
arguing for takings protection for TDRs, while arguing against applying the
Takings Clause to protect development from more restrictive regulations
generally, like the original landmarking of Grand Central itself.
Simply the fact of this new chapter in the Penn Central litigation is bound
for fame (or infamy) and has instantly become a critical addendum to the
most-studied takings case of all time.15  Just the story behind the litigation is
fascinating and worthy of attention.  But the questions raised by the litigation
implicate the ongoing viability of TDRs in New York City and beyond. More
than that, too, the new litigation offers an unusual insight into the value and
protection of “regulatory property”16 and the entrenching effect it can have
on public policy.
The concept of regulatory property is not new, and indeed has been the
topic of important scholarship since at least the 1960s.17  But regulatory
property has become increasingly important and valuable in our modern
economy, and includes such assets as pollution credits, fishing quotas, taxi
medallions, financial guarantees, and the telecommunications spectrum,
among many others.18  Extending takings protection to these forms of prop-
breadth of TDRs, see ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE TDR HANDBOOK: DESIGNING AND
IMPLEMENTING TRANSFER TO DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS 131–40 (2012) (surveying
examples); Matthew P. Garvey, When Political Muscle Is Enough: The Case for Limited Judicial
Review of Long Distance Transfers of Development Rights, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 798, 802 (2003)
(describing TDR regimes); Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitu-
tional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459,
466 n.35 (1999); see also id. at 512 app. A (compiling list of TDR programs).
13 See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 15–25 (evaluating pros and cons of TDRs);
Miller, supra note 12 (examining legal challenges to TDRs); cf. Steven J. Eagle, Environmen-
tal Amenities, Private Property, and Public Policy, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 425, 437 (2004)
(describing the incentive of government officials to achieve goals “off budget” (quoting
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part))).
14 See, e.g., JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW:
STANDING GROUND 96–97 (2014); J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic
Preservation Laws After Penn Central, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2004).
15 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 5 (“While it is unclear how the court will decide, it is R
clear that the controversy surrounding Penn Central is back—and Property professors
might need to update their casebooks accordingly.”).
16 See Eagle, supra note 10, at 1 (“Regulatory property refers specifically to governmen-
tal dispensations of special privilege to individuals that are legally or functionally regarded
as property, and are bestowed for the articulated purpose of furthering the public good.”).
17 See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
18 Thanks to Nestor Davidson for highlighting some of these examples.
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erty, however, can transform the regulatory regime that creates them into a
kind of one-way ratchet that limits governmental power.  Having created fish-
ing rights or pollution credits, can a later government change course and
regulate more directly—say by prohibiting certain kinds of fishing or pollu-
tion outright?  TDRs raise precisely this problem, and so the new Grand Cen-
tral litigation offers an unusually crystalized opportunity to examine these
important questions.  Even without a judicial resolution to the litigation, the
genie is out the bottle, and the issues need to be addressed.
This Article tells the captivating story of the new Grand Central litiga-
tion, identifies the important tensions it reflects between regulatory stability
and the need for change, and ultimately proposes a kind of clear-statement
rule that will preserve the viability of TDRs going forward.  The Article ulti-
mately and provocatively argues that the strength of regulatory promises—
here, that zoning in the receiving area for the TDRs would not change—
naturally decreases over time.  While the value of regulatory property
depends on legal stability, there is a countervailing need for regulatory flexi-
bility that increases as time passes.  It is therefore unreasonable for investors
to assume that regulatory promises will last in perpetuity.  This Article con-
cludes by identifying the self-amortizing character of such regulatory
property.
I. THE SAGA OF THE GRAND CENTRAL TDRS
In 1965, following the destruction of the original Penn Station, New
York City adopted a comprehensive landmarks law that created a preserva-
tion commission with the power to protect individual buildings as well as
entire neighborhoods.19  In 1967, after public hearings, the commission des-
ignated Grand Central Terminal as one of the early landmarks.  Only a few
months later, the Penn Central Authority—the owner of Grand Central at
the time—entered into a partnership with a developer to build a fifty-five-
story office building on top of the terminal.  When the landmarks commis-
sion rejected the proposal, Penn Central sued, claiming that the commis-
sion’s actions amounted to a taking of the air rights above Grand Central.
According to the Court, the landmarking of Grand Central was not a
taking, in part, because of the offsetting benefits that Penn Central received
from transferable development rights.20  Those TDRs effectively allowed
Penn Central to transfer its air rights over Grand Central to adjacent prop-
erty.  Because they were sufficiently valuable, the landmarking did not effect
an unconstitutional taking.21
19 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (describing history of
landmark preservation).
20 Id. at 137.
21 There are numerous questions about the TDRs that have been addressed in depth
in the literature, even if they remain unresolved.  One is whether the TDRs counted as just
compensation for the landmarking of Grand Central, or whether they blunted the regula-
tion’s impact such that there was no taking and therefore no compensation was required at
all. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12 (examining problem); Paul Merwin, Note, Caught
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL208.txt unknown Seq: 6 18-JAN-17 12:23
918 notre dame law review [vol. 92:2
New York (and many other cities) regularly use TDRs to minimize the
harm from land use regulations, or as part of a bargained-for exchange for
air rights.22  If, for whatever reason, a municipality wants to prevent develop-
ment in a certain location—perhaps for historic preservation—it can create
TDRs for the affected property owners.  Broadly speaking, those TDR holders
can then sell their TDRs to developers who want to build bigger buildings
than the applicable zoning regime would otherwise allow.  But this interac-
tion between TDRs and zoning requires some additional explanation.
A zoning ordinance limits buildings’ bulk by imposing maximum height
limits, establishing minimum setbacks from property lines, and—at least in
some municipalities—specifying maximum floor area ratios (FARs), among
other limits.  FAR is particularly important for New York City’s TDRs.  It
refers to the relationship between the size of the lot and the maximum
amount of floor space that a building can contain.  For example, a 1000-
square-foot lot, with an FAR of two, could contain no more than 2000 square
feet of floor area.  In New York City, TDRs allow developers to transfer FAR
from one lot to another, effectively allowing the acquirer to include more
floor space in a building.23  For example, if a lot is subject to an FAR of ten, a
developer could acquire TDRs and build, perhaps, to an FAR of fifteen
(which might represent as many as ten additional floors if the building only
occupies half of the lot, for example).  Extra stories resulting from TDRs are
particularly valuable because they frequently allow the developer to build
higher than neighboring buildings, and higher floors are more valuable than
lower ones.24  In an impressive and thorough study of TDR markets in New
Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake: The Takings Clause and Transferable Development Rights
Programs, 83 MINN. L. REV. 815, 840 (1999) (discussing whether “TDRs merely represent
compensation for a taking”).  Another is whether it was important to the outcome in Penn
Central that the Penn Central Authority owned some of the parcels on which the TDRs
could be used.  In a subsequent decision, Justice Scalia intimated as much. See Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 749 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
22 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 265–83 (listing different TDR programs); Bran- R
don Keith Boffard, Transferable Development Rights in New York City (May 1, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/413 (describ-
ing TDRs in New York); see also generally supra note 12. R
23 See, e.g., Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: “Post-
Zoning”?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 435 (2013) (describing TDR programs and how they work).
24 See, e.g., Daniel Geiger, The Little Loophole Helping Developers Build Their Supertall Tow-
ers Even Higher, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20160117/REAL_ESTATE/160119882/the-little-loophole-helping-developers-build-high
er-supertall-skyscrapers-in-new-york-city (“‘Higher floors are more valuable,’ [developer]
Beninati said.  ‘It’s a bedrock rule of real estate.’  The value of height can vary significantly,
said Ryan Schleis, vice president of research and analytics at brokerage Corcoran.  ‘In gen-
eral, a floor premium, controlling for other factors such as view, is 0.5% to 2%,’ he said.”).
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York City, the Furman Center found that while TDR values can fluctuate dra-
matically, there is a robust market for them.25
TDRs, however, could undermine the integrity of a zoning ordinance if
they could be used anywhere in any amount.  It is one thing to add fifteen
stories to a building in midtown Manhattan; it is another altogether to do the
same in brownstone Brooklyn.  For this reason, New York City’s TDR regime
only allows the receiving property to exceed the FAR limits and not other
bulk limits such as height or setback requirements.26  Moreover, TDRs typi-
cally restrict the so-called receiving area where they can be used, and some-
times the amount that can be transferred to any one lot.27  The receiving
area for the Grand Central TDRs was originally limited to only property con-
tiguous to, cattycornered from, or directly facing Grand Central, or to “any
chain of adjacent lots in the same ownership as the landmark site.”28
The narrowly circumscribed receiving area made the Grand Central
TDRs quite difficult but not impossible to use.  In 1979, Penn Central trans-
ferred nearly 75,000 square feet of TDRs to the Philip Morris building across
from Grand Central.29  It also sought to transfer an additional 800,000
square feet of TDRs to a building several blocks away, reasoning that the
building was in a “chain of adjacent lots” because it was connected via the
underground railroad tracks that Penn Central owned.30  The City objected
to this argument but partially relented by expanding the receiving area of the
TDRs within a newly-identified “midtown subdistrict.”  This expanded to
twenty-one the number of eligible lots that could receive the TDRs.  As a
result, Penn Central subsequently transferred over 300,000 square feet of
TDRs to the new receiving area.  Nevertheless, forty years later, Penn Central
still owned approximately 1.2 million square feet of unused TDRs from the
original Grand Central landmarking.31  By way of comparison, a 1.2 million-
square-foot development in Los Angeles could provide a fifty-six-bed hospital,
25 FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, BUYING SKY: THE MARKET FOR
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY 9 (2013) (“[P]rices paid in individ-
ual transactions varied widely, from less than $50 to more than $500 per square foot.”).
26 Other TDR regimes allow property owners to transfer additional height, or other
forms of density, as well. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 106 (“Development rights
may be calculated and allocated in accordance with factors including dwelling units, area,
floor area, floor area ratio, height limitations, traffic generation, or any other criteria that
will quantify a value for the development rights . . . .” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 36-66A-1
(2016))).
27 Transfers can be effected through zoning lot mergers, in which case the receiving
property must be adjacent, or through the creation of special districts that are nevertheless
narrowly defined.  For an excellent and thorough description of these and other program
designs, see Been & Infranca, supra note 23. R
28 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 158 (4th
ed. 2013) (quoting N.Y. City Planning Comm’n, No. CP-20938, in Calendar of the City of
New York, Nov. 5, 1969, at 875 (describing history of Grand Central TDRs)).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 5.
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nearly 900 units of housing, shops, and 1500 parking spaces.32  In Nashville,
Tennessee, a massive new convention center is listed at 1.2 million square
feet; it spans six square blocks and nearly a quarter of the downtown.33  This
is an enormous amount of development potential contained in the unused
TDRs.
In 2006, a consortium of investors, Midtown TDR Ventures (“Midtown
Ventures”), purchased Grand Central.34  The terminal itself had an entirely
predictable and—according to Midtown Ventures—limited value because it
is subject to a 300-year ground lease with the Metropolitan Transit Authority
at “minimal rent.”35  But the New York real estate market has been incredibly
hot, and Midtown Ventures anticipated that the area around Grand Central
was ripe for redevelopment.  Midtown Ventures claims that the TDRs were, in
fact, the principle value in the transaction.36
Midtown Ventures was right, at least in part.  Shortly after purchasing
Grand Central, a developer—SL Green—acquired property next door and
formulated plans to develop a sky-high new building named One Vanderbilt
for its address on Vanderbilt Place.  Green proposed a nearly 1500-foot-tall
building that would tower over both the Empire State and Chrysler buildings
nearby.37  It is expected to be one of the tallest buildings in New York City.
As proposed, it also far exceeded the FAR on the lot, and so Midtown antici-
pated being able to sell as much as half of its 1.2 million square feet of TDRs
to SL Green.38
Simultaneously, however, New York City undertook plans—allegedly in
consultation with, and at the behest of, SL Green39—to rezone the East Mid-
town corridor around Grand Central, comprising a total of five lots including
One Vanderbilt.  On May 27, 2015, the City adopted the rezoning, allowing
SL Green to build One Vanderbilt without acquiring any TDRs from Mid-
32 See What Does a Million-Square-Foot Development Look Like? Echo Park May Soon Find Out,
EASTSIDER (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.theeastsiderla.com/2009/08/what-does-a-million-
square-foot-development-look-like-echo-park-may-soon-find-out/.
33 See Keith Schneider, Nashville’s Skyline Being Reshaped by Building Boom, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/realestate/commercial/nashvilles-
skyline-being-rebuilt-by-building-boom.html.
34 See Sam Roberts, Grand Central’s Flesh-and-Blood Landlord, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM
BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:16 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/grand-
centrals-flesh-and-blood-landlord/?_r=0 (noting that Midtown Trackage Ventures pur-
chased Grand Central in 2006).
35 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 5.
36 See id. (stating that “Midtown made its investment in order to acquire these TDRs”).
37 See, e.g., Jessica Dailey, City Council Green Lights 1,500-Foot One Vanderbilt, CURBED N.Y.
(May 27, 2015), http://ny.curbed.com/2015/5/27/9956470/city-council-green-lights-
1500-foot-one-vanderbilt (describing development); see also Amy Plitt, New Looks at 1,500-
Foot One Vanderbilt Amid NYC’s Skyline, CURBED N.Y. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://ny.curbed.com/
2015/12/4/9894320/new-looks-at-1500-foot-one-vanderbilt-amid-nycs-skyline (“The 1,500-
foot-tall tower pretty much dwarfs [the Chrysler Building and the Empire State
Building] . . . .”).
38 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 54.
39 Id. ¶ 8.
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town Ventures, so long as it invested in certain infrastructure and transit
improvements instead.40  The effect, according to Midtown Ventures, was to
transfer $475 million from Midtown Ventures to SL Green, because SL Green
no longer needed to acquire the TDRs to build the planned skyscraper.41
And this, according to Midtown Ventures, constituted a regulatory taking of
the TDRs.
Midtown Ventures’ complaint set forth a number of causes of action.  It
alleged spot zoning, unjust enrichment, and also a provocative claim that the
City engaged in impermissible “zoning for dollars.”42  However, it was the
pure takings claim that raised the most important conceptual issues.43
During the summer of 2016, the original investors in Midtown Ventures
sold their stake in the TDRs.  One new investor reportedly paid $63 million
for a share, and other investors included K. Thomas and Frederick
Elghanayan, real estate developers in New York City, who paid an undisclosed
sum.44  The new owners of Midtown Ventures quickly changed their
approach to the lawsuit and settled.45  It is difficult to know their motives, but
one can speculate that the Elghanayans anticipate using the TDRs them-
selves, perhaps for a new project in the receiving area.46  Regardless, the case
settled quickly, and One Vanderbilt is back on track.
The question that the litigation presented, however, remains pressing:
whether the existence of the TDRs means that the government cannot
upzone property in the receiving area without violating the Takings Clause.
That, in turn, depends upon the extent to which the Takings Clause protects
regulatory property—i.e., property that is wholly the creation of the state—
from regulatory changes that significantly impact its value.  This question is
not limited to TDRs, but implicates government control over all forms of
regulatory property, and indeed perhaps over more traditional property as
well.
40 Id. ¶¶ 70–71.
41 Id. ¶ 79.
42 Id. ¶¶ 148–65 (setting forth spot zoning and reverse spot zoning claims); id.
¶¶ 166–71 (setting forth unjust enrichment claim); id. ¶¶ 140–47 (setting forth “zoning
for dollars” claim).  The “zoning for dollars” claim alleges that the City, in effect, sold its
zoning power by offering additional FAR in exchange for improvements that the City and
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) were already obligated to undertake.
Therefore, the neighborhood did not benefit from the infrastructure improvements
required of SL Green, since they would have happened anyway; only the City’s coffers
improved. See id. ¶¶ 95–110; see also Mun. Art Soc’y of N.Y. v. City of New York, 522
N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (invalidating zoning decision that, in effect, exchanged
an FAR bonus for cash).
43 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 12.
44 See Bagli, supra note 7 (describing dismissal of suit). R
45 See id. (“The new partners promptly abandoned the litigation strategy.”).
46 Cf. Holly Dutton, Elghanayan Scion Who Grew up with the New Long Island City, REAL
EST. WKLY. (May 8, 2015), http://rew-online.com/2015/05/08/elghanayan-scion-who-
grew-up-with-the-new-long-island-city/ (describing new building projects in Manhattan and
Brooklyn).
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II. TDRS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
There are two pieces of conventional wisdom about regulatory takings:
(1) the analysis is hopelessly muddled; and (2) governments seldom lose.
Neither is quite right.  The outlines of takings analysis are by now quite well
established, even if the application is difficult to predict in any given case.47
And, as Professors Jim Krier and Stewart Sterk have recently shown, plaintiffs
at least occasionally survive summary judgment.48  So how should courts ana-
lyze takings claims like Midtown Ventures’?
The purpose here is not to predict what a court would actually have
done if the case had not settled prior to trial.  Midtown Ventures’ takings
claim raises important theoretical issues that highlight the contested nature
of regulatory property.  Nevertheless, it is worth first working through the
outlines of the relevant doctrinal analysis, at least in cursory fashion, to high-
light how and why the more theoretical issues arise.
The relevant regulatory takings standard comes from the original Penn
Central three-factor ad hoc balancing test that focuses on (1) the character of
the regulation; (2) the diminution in value resulting from the regulation;
and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct (or reason-
able) investment-backed expectations.49  There is little doubt that Midtown
Ventures’ takings claim would have faced a number of hurdles.  The case
likely settled as it did because the parties recognized that some might have
proven insurmountable.50
First, it is not at all clear why the Penn Central analysis should be applied
to the TDRs alone, instead of to the entire Grand Central parcel.51  While
Midtown Ventures claimed that the terminal itself retains only limited value,
the Supreme Court in Penn Central rejected that takings claim in 1978 in part
because the landmarking of the terminal did not interfere with the ongoing
use of property as a railroad terminal, which the Court characterized as con-
47 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–40 (2005) (summarizing tak-
ings analysis).
48 James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 35, 58 (2016).
49 For a thorough discussion of each of the elements, see Robert Meltz, Takings Law
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307 (2007).  None of the per se takings
rules apply.  The upzoning is not a permanent physical occupation, under Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), nor is it a total wipeout of all econom-
ically valuable use of the property under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), because the TDRs can still be used on other parcels.
50 See, e.g., Bagli, supra note 7 (“Carl Weisbrod, the chairman of the city’s Planning
Commission, also welcomed the settlement, saying that the de Blasio administration
believed that the lawsuit had no merit.”).  This is so despite Midtown Ventures being repre-
sented by Laurence Tribe, the preeminent constitutional scholar.  For a lively account of
the parties involved, see Charles V. Bagli, Law Professor Opposes Grand Central Tower Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/nyregion/law-professor-
opposes-grand-central-tower-plan.html.
51 The so-called “parcel as a whole” rule is perennially contested. See, e.g., Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1016 n.7.
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stituting Penn Central’s principal expectations regarding the use of its prop-
erty.52  The fact that Midtown Ventures purchased the property primarily for
the TDRs does not transform them automatically into a distinct interest for
constitutional purposes.53  But assuming arguendo that the TDRs are the rel-
evant property, application of the Penn Central factors was still likely to be
contested.
The character of the regulation would not have cut one way or another
in this case.  Typically, this first factor is used only to identify those regula-
tions that amount to permanent physical occupations of property.54  Even
where a court adopts a more capacious approach, the weight of this factor is
difficult to predict.  On the one hand, a rezoning—and in particular, an
upzoning—is a routine regulation that seldom raises takings problems.  On
the other hand, Midtown Ventures alleged that the upzoning in this instance
was the result of favoritism and amounted to a kind of singling out of the
TDRs themselves—that the purpose of the rezoning was explicitly to transfer
value from Midtown Ventures to SL Green.55  Evidence of that claim might,
in fact, have changed the application of this first factor, depending on how a
court applied it.  Regardless, this factor is seldom dispositive for the resolu-
tion of regulatory takings that do not involve a permanent physical occupa-
tion of property by the government.56
The diminution in value prong would have required significant factual
development.  Undoubtedly, upzoning the property around Grand Central
reduced the value of Midtown Ventures’ TDRs, but the extent of the diminu-
tion would have been contested.  After all, the receiving area of the TDRs
includes twenty-one different parcels, and the rezoning affected only five.
52 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (“[T]he New
York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal.  Its
designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue
to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal
containing office space and concessions.  So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”).
53 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674–78 (1988) (defining conceptual
severance).
54 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649
(2012) (surveying the “character” prong); see also John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn
Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 186–99 (2005) (same).
55 For an argument that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent such singling
out, see for example Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COM-
MENT. 279, 300–03 (1992); John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2003); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV.
1333, 1338 (1991); see also Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(evaluating various approaches to “singling out”). But see Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem
of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 37–52 (2008) (arguing against an equal-treat-
ment conception of takings liability).
56 See Davidson, supra note 55, at 30; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (articulating the “permanent physical occupation”
test).
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The TDRs were potentially valuable if they could be used on any of the addi-
tional sixteen parcels.  But that depends on the likelihood of redevelopment
on any other parcel in the receiving area.  TDRs, after all, are only valuable
when property is developed.  If buildings already in place are not likely to be
redeveloped anytime in the foreseeable future—as Midtown Ventures in fact
claimed57—then the impact of the upzoning on the remaining TDRs looks
more significant.  The dynamic is entirely predictable.  The fewer viable
receiving lots there are, the greater the bargaining power of the prospective
buyer (even monopsony power, at the extreme).  And the greater the impact
of the rezoning on the value of the TDRs, the more likely it would have been
a taking.  It is at least plausible that the East Midtown upzoning dramatically
decreased the value of the remaining TDRs, as Midtown Ventures alleged in
its complaint.58  Of course, the fact that a new investor reportedly paid $63
million for a share of Midtown Ventures, and other investors more, suggests
that the TDRs retained considerable value even after the rezoning.59
Indeed, the fact of that purchase may have been the nail in the coffin of the
takings claim and precipitated the settlement.
The final factor is the most important for defining the content of regula-
tory property.  As originally articulated by the Court in Penn Central, this fac-
tor concerns the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations.60  Midtown Ventures claims that City offi-
cials made representations that the TDRs would remain valuable property at
the time Grand Central was originally landmarked.61  And in fact, the Penn
Central Authority had successfully sold over one million square feet of TDRs
in the past, demonstrating that the TDRs were valuable.62  There is little
doubt that Midtown Ventures had distinct expectations that it would be able
to sell the TDRs, backed by the investment that Midtown Ventures made to
purchase them.
However, following Penn Central, the Supreme Court has subtly restated
this factor to focus instead on protecting reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations.63  Under this formulation, the sine qua non is not whether the prop-
erty owner’s expectations were distinct—as opposed to vague—but whether
they were reasonable.  A property owner denied permission to build a gas
station in the heart of a quiet residential neighborhood may not have reason-
57 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 82 (“[T]he Vanderbilt Corridor includes the only sites
in the Grand Central Subdistrict with the possibility for redevelopment within any reasona-
ble time horizon.”).
58 Id. ¶ 84.
59 See Bagli, supra note 7. R
60 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
61 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 4.
62 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (describing disposition of TDRs).
63 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see also Steven J. Eagle,
The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 560–61 (2002) (discussing the
change from “expectations” to “reasonable expectations”); Christopher Serkin, Passive Tak-
ings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 350 & n.18 (2014)
(same).
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able expectations, for example.64  This analysis is quite different than
whether a property owner had actually spent money in reliance on specific
plans (i.e., whether the expectations were distinct).  For Midtown Ventures, it
depends on the extent to which it was reasonable to rely on the stability of
the TDR regime.  But there is something inherently circular about this analy-
sis.  The reasonableness of Midtown Ventures’ expectations depends in large
part on the legal protection afforded to the TDRs.65
The real question, then, which the Penn Central analysis does not answer,
is whether and to what extent the existence of the Grand Central TDRs
should prevent the City from upzoning the neighboring property in the
absence of compensation.  If the creation of the TDRs comes with an implicit
promise not to regulate in a way that undermines their value, then Midtown
Ventures’ investment looks much more reasonable.  If not, then the rezoning
is a risk that Midtown Ventures should have anticipated.66
Although this particular litigation has been settled, the stakes remain
very high for the viability of TDR regimes going forward.  TDRs are only use-
ful for reducing the impact of government actions to the extent that they are
actually valuable.  The risk that the government might upzone the receiving
area where the TDRs can be used will reduce their value ex ante.  Absent
strong legal protection, the value of TDRs will have to be discounted by the
risk of adverse regulatory action in the future.
III. PROTECTING THE VALUE OF THE TDRS
The perceived value of the TDRs is a central consideration, both for
courts evaluating the offsetting benefits of TDRs, and for property owners
evaluating whether to accept TDRs as part of a voluntary transaction.67  If the
value of TDRs going forward must be significantly discounted to reflect an
increased risk that the City will undermine them, then more TDRs will be
necessary to appease courts or property owners.  As the price per square foot
64 See Serkin, supra note 63, at 351 (“If someone buys property in a neighborhood
zoned single-family residential, she cannot complain when she is prevented from develop-
ing the property as a gas station, an adult theater, an apartment building, or for another
more intensive use.”).
65 The problem is closely analogous to the problem of “deregulatory takings” where
owners of regulated property—like energy infrastructure—object when the industry is der-
egulated. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi,
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000).
66 For an insightful treatment of expectations in the context of financial firms, see
Nestor M. Davidson, Resetting the Baseline of Ownership: Takings and Investor Expectations After
the Bailouts, 75 MD. L. REV. 722 (2016).
67 Many TDR programs are voluntary or are part of a voluntary transaction.  When
New York City built the High Line, for example, it bargained for air rights using TDRs,
resulting in consensual transactions. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing R
creation of High Line).  Those transactions may have occurred in the shadow of eminent
domain, but that does not change the fact that property owners ultimately agreed to the
City’s terms.
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of TDRs goes down to reflect the kind of regulatory risk of the East Midtown
rezoning, a municipality will have to give away more square footage in TDRs
to achieve the same value of benefit.
This is particularly important because governments may already have a
tendency to give them away too freely.  TDRs are a kind of off-balance-sheet
benefit that can be created spontaneously at no obvious expense to the pub-
lic.  As a result, there is little political accountability associated with their cre-
ation.68  They are not, however, free.  The costs come from the increased
congestion in the receiving area.  Since TDRs allow development at greater
density than the zoning ordinance anticipates or approves, they create a kind
of “extra” burden on the receiving area, from traffic and infrastructure bur-
dens, to school crowding, aesthetic harms, and so forth.69  By undermining
the value of the Grand Central TDRs, the City may be undermining overall
confidence in the TDR regime, potentially requiring the City to create many
more TDRs to generate the same value as before, or else requiring other,
more explicit forms of compensation in the alternative.
A complementary response is equally problematic.  Instead of or in addi-
tion to issuing more TDRs, a government could impose greater restrictions
on the receiving area to enhance the value of the TDRs, at least in the short
term.70  This dynamic is already embedded in any TDR regime.  Professor
Steven Eagle has argued against the use of TDRs precisely because they rely
on the government over-regulating the receiving area.71  Eagle argues that if
higher density development in the receiving area is appropriate following
acquisition of TDRs, it should be appropriate in the absence of the TDRs.72
That is, if TDRs would allow a developer in the receiving zone to build to an
FAR of six instead of an FAR of five, then the developer should be allowed to
build to an FAR of six as of right.
In its strong form, this argument misconstrues the kinds of tradeoffs that
are ubiquitous in land use controls.  Eagle implicitly asserts that an FAR of six
either is appropriate in the receiving area or it is not.  If it is not appropriate,
it should not be allowed, regardless of TDRs.  And if it is appropriate, then
developers should be able to build to that limit as of right.  In fact, however,
zoning is much more fluid than this and frequently represents dynamic
68 In New York City, some measure of political accountability comes from any zoning
action that triggers the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), see N.Y. CITY CHAR-
TER ch. 8, § 197-c (2016) (identifying actions that trigger the ULURP process).  Rezonings
trigger ULURP, but zoning lot mergers—one way of creating TDRs—do not. Cf. Been &
Infranca, supra note 23, at 440–43 (describing TDRs created through zoning lot mergers).
69 NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 18 (discussing objections to the designation of R
receiving areas).  Some theorists view this consequence of TDRs as a benefit, effectively
unlocking development potential in places where existing zoning is too restrictive. See, e.g.,
FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, supra note 12. R
70 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 5, at 1188–90. R
71 See Eagle, supra note 10, at 34–36 (“If it indeed harms the public health, safety, and
welfare for the former owner of a lot to build eight units per acre, why is it suddenly
acceptable for the TDR holder to build eight units per acre?” (footnote omitted)).
72 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL208.txt unknown Seq: 15 18-JAN-17 12:23
2016] P E N N C E N T R A L  take  two 927
tradeoffs.  A city may, for example, have good reason to limit buildings in an
area to an FAR of five, and adopt that limit in its zoning regime.  But it may
have an even greater interest in protecting a historic building.  It is appropri-
ate to weigh the costs of adding height in the receiving zone against the ben-
efits of the historic preservation.  Creating TDRs to preserve the historic
building that nevertheless allows an FAR of six in the receiving zone repre-
sents nothing more than a straightforward cost-benefit analysis.  It does not
undermine the city’s implicit assertion that an FAR of six in the otherwise
FAR five zone is harmful, but means instead that it is less harmful than the
destruction of the historic building.73  Nevertheless, the weaker form of
Eagle’s argument is undoubtedly correct; local governments have an incen-
tive to enact overly restrictive zoning in receiving areas in order to enhance
the value of TDRs.74  If increased risks associated with TDRs undermine their
value, local governments might respond by enacting even more restrictive
zoning in order to increase their value in the short term, at the expense of
sound land use planning.
The discussion so far suggests that courts should protect the value of
TDRs from regulatory change ex post in order to preserve their value and
usefulness to government ex ante.  Courts, in other words, should step in to
protect government from itself.  But the problem is actually deeper and sub-
tler than it already appears because government preferences change over
time.  Municipal governments are not static and their preferences are not set
in amber.  Moreover, conditions in the world change.  Appropriate land use
controls at one time may become wholly inappropriate at another as technol-
ogy changes, preferences evolve, and sea levels rise, for example.75  If the
existence of TDRs means that a government cannot upzone property in the
receiving area, this can lock in out-of-date land use policy and hobble a subse-
quent government’s ability to respond to change.  Framed in this way, afford-
ing constitutional protection to TDR holders like Midtown Ventures raises a
real entrenchment problem.76
73 Cf. NOLON, supra note 14, at 97 (describing the TDR program as protecting valuable R
environmental resources while allowing the town to preserve its rural character by encour-
aging denser planned unit developments).
74 See Eagle, supra note 10, at 35–36.
75 See Serkin, supra note 63, at 353–54; see also Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington,
Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1667, 1682–83 (2013) (describing the effect of changing consumer preferences
on the forms of exclusionary zoning).
76 The entrenchment problem has received recent scholarly attention.  Leading arti-
cles include: Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002); Serkin, supra note 8. R
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IV. THE ENTRENCHING EFFECT OF TAKINGS PROTECTION FOR TDRS
It is a fundamental tenet of democracy that one government cannot
make policy decisions for future governments.77  One legislature cannot pass
un-repealable laws, and even the Constitution is subject to amendment
through Article V (although it is undoubtedly specially entrenched).78
Despite this black letter prohibition, governments regularly find ways to
entrench their policies into the future.  In an earlier article, I explored this
phenomenon in depth, examining in particular the ways in which local gov-
ernments can, and do, use private law to lock in policy commitments.79  For
example, issuing debt, entering into long-term contracts, creating conserva-
tion easements, and so forth, all significantly limit future governments’ ability
to change course.80  More recently, Professors Daryl Levinson and Benjamin
Sachs explored political entrenchment and the ways in which government
officials can leverage political devices to entrench policies.81  Both analyses
recognize that entrenchment is much more common than most scholarship
has acknowledged, but that does not make it benign.  Instead, the underlying
insight is that entrenchment is not binary but instead exists on a spectrum.
The question in every instance is therefore not whether the government
action is entrenching; most are.  The question is whether the government
action is “problematically or impermissibly entrenching.”82  Answering that
requires weighing both the costs and the benefits of regulatory lock-in.
Preventing a government from enacting a regulatory change because of
an earlier government’s precommitment can impose a very real cost.  In the
case of Grand Central, preventing neighboring property from being
upzoned—or increasing the cost of the upzoning so as to make it prohibi-
tively expensive—would have imposed a meaningful cost to the City as well as
to real estate consumers.  Restricting the supply of developable land in mid-
town Manhattan marginally increases prices there and elsewhere.  It also
means that property next door to one of the most important transit hubs in
New York City is under-used compared to what the City would now prefer.83
Retaining overly restrictive zoning marginally pushes development pressure
elsewhere in the city, increasing congestion in places less able to manage it.
All else being equal, increased development around Grand Central makes
good sense as urban policy and unlocks value for property owners and con-
77 Serkin, supra note 8, at 881 (“In a democracy, governments are not allowed to bind
future governments.”).
78 See Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 701, 753–58 (2016) (describing constitutional entrenchment).
79 See Serkin, supra note 8.
80 See id. at 892–915 (surveying forms of entrenchment).
81 Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE
L.J. 400 (2015).
82 Serkin, supra note 8, at 889; see also Levinson & Sachs, supra note 81, at 460.
83 This takes at face value the purpose of the rezoning and rejects—for purposes of
this discussion—Midtown Ventures’ allegations of cronyism as a reason for the rezoning.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL208.txt unknown Seq: 17 18-JAN-17 12:23
2016] P E N N C E N T R A L  take  two 929
sumers.  If the existence of the Grand Central TDRs had prevented the City
from upzoning the property, these would have been real costs.
Some might object that the stakes were far lower than this analysis sug-
gests.  After all, even the takings protection for TDRs that Midtown Ventures
initially sought would not have prevented the City from upzoning property in
the receiving zone; it would only have required the government to pay for
the adverse impact on the value of the TDRs.  In other words, because of the
nature of the Takings Clause, TDRs receive at most liability-rule protection
against regulatory change and not property-rule protection.84  The City
could always upzone property in receiving zones, but simply must pay to do
so.  In other words, the TDRs, at their strongest, would not prevent the gov-
ernment from regulating; they merely require the government to compen-
sate for the resulting diminution in value.85  But where the alleged harm is
$475 million, and the claim for damages is over $1 billion,86 that may be a
distinction without a meaningful difference.87  At the very least, the threat of
takings liability is likely to affect regulatory incentives.
Midtown Ventures also pointed out in its complaint that nothing in the
prior zoning regime prevented intensive development around Grand Cen-
tral, even at the density proposed by SL Green.88  It simply required that the
developer acquire TDRs from Midtown Ventures instead of building as of
right.  The stakes of takings protection for TDRs, then, are not whether
development happens, but only the allocation of profits between the TDR
holder and the developer.
In this case, Midtown Ventures characterized the upzoning as a one-to-
one transfer from Midtown Ventures to SL Green.89  The outcome that Mid-
town Ventures anticipated in its complaint was simply that the cost of the
84 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (describing the differ-
ence between property- and liability-rule protections).
85 See Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation Easements
over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 359 (2010) (identifying eminent domain as an
important anti-entrenchment mechanism).
86 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 12; see also Bagli, supra note 4 (identifying damages as
$1.1 billion).
87 See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the Envi-
ronment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (2005) (“[I]f regulatory programs were to
generate significant, recurring takings awards, the general expectation is that government
would be forced to abandon the regulatory option.”).  By way of comparison, New York
City’s total budget in 2015 was $75 billion. See, e.g., Yoav Gonen, City Council Approves $75B
Budget for 2015 Fiscal Year, N.Y. POST (June 26, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/06/26/
city-council-approves-75b-budget-for-2015-fiscal-year/.
88 See Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 10 (claiming that One Vanderbilt would have been built
regardless of the rezoning).
89 Id. ¶ 78 (“SL Green succeeded in persuading the City to transfer the value and
benefits of the necessary Grand Central Terminal TDRs to it without paying Midtown for
them.”).
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TDRs would eat into SL Green’s profits.90  But that is not necessarily so.  In
her analysis of development exactions, Professor Vicki Been demonstrated
that the price of exactions will not always be borne by the developer that
actually pays them.91  Even if SL Green had paid Midtown Ventures to
acquire the TDRs in the first instance, it might have passed some or all of
those costs along to its customers, effectively building them into the price
that it would have charged to the eventual occupants of the building.92  The
ability of a developer to pass on costs, though, depends on the elasticity of
the real estate market and the availability of substitute property.93  If there
are sufficiently comparable properties nearby that were built at a lower price-
per-square-foot without TDRs, those developers could have undercut SL
Green.  In that case, going forward, the cost of TDRs may instead be borne in
part by the owners of the underlying land.  In effect, higher development
costs can often be capitalized into land values.  A developer like SL Green
would be expected to pay less for the land if the costs of development are
higher because of the need to acquire TDRs.
In most cases, the cost of the TDRs is likely to be absorbed to some
extent by all three: the owner of the underlying land, the developer, and the
end consumers.  At the very least, the effect of the City’s upzoning is much
more complex and contingent than a one-to-one transfer from Midtown Ven-
tures to SL Green.
There is another way in which prohibiting the upzoning in this case
would have been costly for the City.  When the City rezoned One Vanderbilt,
it did not simply give away the extra FAR.  It required SL Green to engage in
certain infrastructure improvements in and around Grand Central in order
to obtain the density bonus.  According to Midtown Ventures, the City priced
that extra FAR much too cheaply, giving an unprecedented bonus for a rela-
tively modest cost.94  Regardless, the City in effect undercut the price of the
TDRs by offering SL Green a density bonus for less money than the TDRs
would have cost.  Cheaply or not, the City will obtain some meaningful infra-
90 Id. ¶ 10 (“[T]he City’s ‘zoning’ took from Midtown the entire value of the Grand
Central TDRs and transferred over $475 million of that value to SL Green, for no purpose
other than to reduce SL Green’s costs and increase its profits in constructing an office
tower that it was going to build anyway.”).
91 See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Uncon-
stitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 540 (1991) (“Many scholars have
assumed or theorized that the full costs of exactions usually will be passed on to the buyer.
Others have argued that the costs generally will be passed back to the landowner.  Both
extremes are unlikely because the incidence of exactions will depend upon the nature of
the supply and demand in the market, as well as the structure of the local building indus-
try.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYS-
CAPE 139, 148 (2005).
92 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 17 (“These extra costs [of TDRs] may reduce R
the profit margin for developers or increase the prices charged to the final consumers, the
home buyers.”).
93 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94 Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 70
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structure improvements in exchange for the FAR bonus—improvements that
would otherwise have been paid out of public coffers if SL Green had
acquired the density bonus through TDRs instead.95
Finally, city officials had an expressive interest in upzoning the property.
Newly elected Mayor de Blasio wanted to signal that his administration would
be willing to work with developers.  The upzoning around Grand Central was
intended, in part, to demonstrate his commitment to development.96  Pre-
sumably, this reputational benefit among developers and their allies could
stimulate increased—or at least continued—development in other parts of
the City.
The bottom line is that prohibiting the City from loosening the zoning
in the receiving area could have had significant policy consequences.  Like-
wise, constraining the City’s power to upzone property in the future has the
potential to impose real costs, beyond just lost profits between Midtown Ven-
tures and SL Green, or between other TDR holders and developers.  TDRs
would become meaningfully entrenching if they required a city to pay com-
pensation when upzoning property in receiving areas and thereby limited
this policy flexibility.
V. HOW TO PROTECT TDRS
For local officials seeking to constrain development in a specific loca-
tion, TDRs have the twin virtues of being relatively easy and inexpensive to
create.  Indeed, their ubiquity is largely a result of the fact that they are off-
budget items; their opacity means that they generate little political accounta-
bility.97  However, the proliferation of TDRs may look quite different to offi-
cials in the future if they limit regulatory control over the receiving area.
In an earlier article, I argued that it is important to view the entrench-
ment problem from the competing perspectives of the government making a
precommitment and the subsequent government bound by it.  “[E]very gov-
ernment is simultaneously a present and future government vis-à-vis others in
time.”98  There is no doubt that strong commitments create some genuine
benefits in other contexts.  Local governments can only borrow money if they
can obligate future governments to repay it.  Contractual counterparties may
offer a better price for services if government precommitments are, in fact,
robust.99  This can benefit not only the precommitting government, but
95 Midtown Ventures also claims that the City was already obligated to provide these
same infrastructure improvements, meaning that the City was not providing the local com-
munity with an adequate quid pro quo for the density bonus. See supra note 42. R
96 See, e.g., Bagli, supra note 50 (“[T]he de Blasio administration is eager to see the
project built, if only to signal to the real estate industry that it is not anti-development.”).
97 See supra text accompanying note 68.
98 Serkin, supra note 8, at 948. R
99 Id. at 937 (“If the government cannot bind itself, then promisees will have to dis-
count the value of government promises, raising the prices that the public has to pay.”
(citing Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 883, 915 (1996))).
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future governments as well that continue to reap some of the benefits.  But at
the same time, binding obligations can impose real costs if conditions in the
world change, or if preferences evolve in unexpected ways.  All governments
therefore want at least some ability to make such precommitments, even if it
means being bound by earlier obligations that they would prefer to avoid, but
only so much as is necessary.100  The real question, then, is not whether to
permit government precommitments at all, but is instead how much to allow.
At some level, all contracts reflect this tension.  Individuals and private
parties decide every day whether it is worth giving up future flexibility in
exchange for benefits today.  But, as I have argued, government precommit-
ments are different in kind because of the possibility of political malfunc-
tions.101  One way of exploring the problem is to ask whether and to what
extent we trust a particular government to bind the future.  It should depend
on the extent to which that government takes adequate account of the long-
term costs of its actions.  The less it does, the easier it should be for subse-
quent governments to change course.
I pointed out that protection from entrenchment can occur either ex
ante or ex post.  Ex ante protections consist either of procedural safeguards
or substantive prohibitions that are designed to minimize the risk of exces-
sive inter-temporal agency costs.102  Bond election requirements are a good
example of the former; forcing local governments to seek voter approval
before incurring excessive debt helps to ensure that local officials are not
passing on unwarranted financial burdens to future generations.103  Strict
constitutional debt limits are a good example of the latter; there are levels of
indebtedness that local officials are simply not allowed to incur.104  Ex post
protections preserve some range of flexibility for future generations.  Munici-
pal bankruptcy is de-entrenching in this account, as are eminent domain and
specialized rules that allow governments to breach contracts without paying
expectation damages.105  Entrenchment is therefore most problematic when
there is a mismatch between the ease of making a precommitment and the
ease of escaping it later on.  The more likely it is that government officials
did not adequately consider the future costs of their precommitments, the
more important it is for future generations to have flexibility in escaping
them.
This is true of TDRs.  If the existence of TDRs prevents subsequent gov-
ernments from upzoning receiving areas, then there will be a significant mis-
100 Id. at 948 (“The question . . . [is] how much power government actors, in general,
want to have to control the future, knowing that it means accepting the thick cords of
preexisting obligations.”).
101 See id. at 938–39.
102 See id. at 915 (describing anti-entrenchment protection).
103 See id. at 925–26 (describing state law rules around issuing municipal debt).
104 See id. (describing constitutional debt limits).
105 See id. at 919–20 (describing municipal bankruptcy rules as ex post entrenchment
protection).
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match between the ease of their creation and the extent of their
entrenchment.
One solution is to limit the ability of TDRs to entrench land use policy.
A judicial determination that upzoning the receiving area is not a taking
would have that effect.  But the very existence of a TDR regime may require
some protection from this kind of legal change.  As described above, a TDR
regime depends on property owners’ willingness to rely on their value.  As
the risks associated with TDRs increase, their value becomes more specula-
tive.  Owners subjected to development limits, and courts evaluating such
restrictions, will therefore demand more TDRs to offset the burdens, if they
continue to accept TDRs at all.  Furthermore, the real public cost of TDRs in
the form of increased congestion in the receiving area will likely be borne in
the future.  If future governments could communicate their preferences to
earlier ones, they might happily agree to be bound by the zoning in the
receiving area—to some extent—in order to limit the number of TDRs that
have to be issued in the first place.  In other words, it is helpful to govern-
ments inter-temporally if they can encourage property owners to rely on
TDRs as valuable benefits.
Indeed, land use law contains other tools that reflect precisely this
desire.  Governments are not generally allowed to promise future regulatory
treatment.  They cannot promise, for example, specific future tax rates, or
which drugs will be legal or illegal.  But, in narrow circumstances, they can
promise future zoning treatment as part of an exchange for benefits pro-
vided by a developer.  These so-called developer agreements are authorized
by state statute and allow a local government to promise favorable land use
treatment in the future in order to induce a developer to make infrastructure
and transit improvements, for example.106  This solves a particular problem.
A local government will want to delay granting approvals until the developer
has actually performed under the agreement so as to ensure satisfactory com-
pliance.  But a developer would be unlikely to undertake those investments
without some meaningful guarantee that municipal officials will live up to
the bargain.107  Enforceable developer agreements solve this problem by
allowing the government to make promises specifically in order to induce
reliance—and performance—by developers.108
The analogy to development agreements is useful not only because it
shows the benefits of entrenched precommitments, but also because it pro-
vides an example of protections that can be put in place.  In most states that
have authorized them, development agreements require public hearings and
106 See id. at 892–94.
107 While this problem is a familiar one in many private contracts, there is a particular
risk of defection by governments.  Agency costs—and in particular inter-temporal ones—
mean that local officials may not fully bear the costs of breach.  Moreover, governments are
generally not obligated to pay expectation damages when they breach contracts.  These
features, combined, make breach more likely. See id. at 937–38 & nn. 272–74 (discussing
the dynamics surrounding breach of public contracts).
108 See id. at 892–93 (discussing developer agreements).
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city council approval.109  In other words, procedural rules ensure some
broad measure of transparency before a government can bind future govern-
ments’ zoning power.  Moreover, some statutes authorizing development
agreements have a time limit.  In Oregon, for example, development agree-
ments are limited to fifteen years.110
The same should be true of TDRs.  At the very least, courts should not
imply from the simple existence of TDRs that the government that created
them intended to prevent future governments from upzoning the receiving
area.  But it should be possible for a government to make that kind of com-
mitment, so long as it does so explicitly and after adequate public notice.  It
must be apparent to voters that the TDR regime will constrain the adoption
of future land use policies before a TDR should be so strongly entrenching.
This proposal closely resembles the “clear statement” rule that applies to
government grants—a different but analogous form of regulatory property.
The most famous articulation comes from Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge.111  In 1785, Massachusetts had conveyed a monopoly franchise to a
private corporation to operate a toll bridge across the Charles River.  Because
of its success, Massachusetts subsequently granted a new franchise to a differ-
ent corporation to operate a second bridge.  The first franchisee sued, alleg-
ing that Massachusetts had promised it exclusive rights for at least forty years.
In rejecting the claim, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the
initial franchise was not explicit about the grant of exclusive rights.  It rea-
soned that the power to regulate for health, safety, and welfare “is as much
inherent and inalienable, as the right of taxation; which, it is said, resides in
the government, and need not be reserved expressly, in any grant of property
or franchises, to individuals or corporations.”112  In other words, the police
power is so important that a government seeking to bargain it away must do
so expressly.  In the absence of a clear statement to that effect, the Court
would not imply one.
Allowing—but neither requiring nor implying—promises accompanying
TDRs to preserve the existing zoning in the receiving area creates flexibility
for the government both today and in the future.  The extent of TDRs’
entrenching effect becomes a bargained-for term between property owners
and the government.  The default is to preserve flexibility for future govern-
ments.  But where a government has a strong reason to attach to TDRs a
commitment not to change the zoning in the receiving area, it can do so
explicitly, just as with other government grants.
109 See id. at 927 (citing Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning
That Is Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 396–99 (2004)).
110 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 94.504 (West 2016); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3229 (West
2015) (thirty years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-40 (2016) (imposing schedule depending on
acreage affected of between five and twenty years); cf. id. § 6-31-110 (creating presumptive
limit of eight years).
111 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 465 (1837).
112 Id. at 468 (citing Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560–61, 563
(1830)).
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The government issuing the TDRs should not, however, have unfettered
discretion to make the TDRs as binding as it wants.  There is a limit to the
strength of the precommitment that the issuing government can make.  Even
with the added procedural protection of a clear statement rule, there is still a
risk that a government today will unduly entrench its land use regulations.
An issuing government may have an interest in enhancing the value of its
TDRs by making an accompanying promise to maintain the zoning in the
receiving area.  But that interest decreases over time.  Simultaneously, the
need for future governments to reclaim land use control increases as devel-
opment pressures and conditions in the world change.
This inter-temporal trade-off closely resembles the problem of dead-
hand control in the context of private precommitments, like trusts that
impose ongoing restrictions on the use and disposition of property.113
Increasing the power of grantors to control their property after death
decreases the alienability of the property for future generations, and vice-
versa.  But this is not the zero-sum game it appears, because the interests of
the grantor decrease over time, while the interests of future generations in
being free of restrictions increase.  A grantor may feel strongly about preserv-
ing property for some prescribed use in the short or even medium term, but
that interest becomes more hypothetical as time passes.114  The longer the
grasping hand, the more likely it is that the world has diverged from expecta-
tions.  At some point—maybe ten, fifty, or even a hundred years after
death—the interests of the living outweigh the preferences of the past.  The
rule against perpetuities at least roughly reflects this very calculus.115
This is even clearer in the context of TDRs.  From the perspective of the
issuing government, the central concern is the value of the TDRs to the bur-
dened property owner.  The value of a precommitment to preserve the zon-
ing in the receiving area diminishes over time for two complimentary
reasons.  Most obviously, a zoning change can only affect the value of unused
TDRs.  If the zoning remains stable long enough for the property owner to
expect to be able to sell all of the TDRs, then any risk of a later rezoning is
immaterial.  Adding additional time to the precommitment is therefore only
valuable to the extent that it increases the likelihood of allowing all the TDRs
to be used.  The marginal value will therefore naturally decrease over the
duration of the precommitment.  Moreover, the value of the TDRs them-
selves decreases over time, thanks to discount rates.  At any moment, the
value of a TDR is the expected value of the development potential it repre-
sents when it is actually sold.  The farther off that is, the lower the value
today.  Think of it this way: a TDR that cannot be used for twenty years will be
worth much less than a TDR that can be used tomorrow.  Therefore, the
impact of a risk that would decrease the value of a TDR will also diminish
over time.
113 See Serkin, supra note 8, at 946 (making this analogy). R
114 See id. at 950.
115 Id. at 949–50 (examining the rule against perpetuities).
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Simultaneously, the costs of entrenching TDRs through zoning increase
over time.  Early zoning advocates believed that the goal of a comprehensive
zoning regime was to identify the ultimate end-state distribution of land uses
within the municipality.116  People quickly realized, however, that zoning was
an evolutionary process.  It is impossible for planners to predict the future.
Technological change, as well as changing demographics and consumer pref-
erences, can combine to make a zoning regime quickly obsolete.  As
described in the previous Part, the actual costs of outdated zoning can be
very high and include exclusionary pressures, as well as real economic costs if
developers and property owners cannot satisfy consumer preferences.117  But
the important point here is that those kinds of costs will rise over time.
Actual community preferences will increasingly diverge from a static zoning
regime.
Costs and benefits will undoubtedly vary by context, but the overall
dynamic is easy enough to see.  The benefits of entrenched precommitments
around zoning decrease over time, while the costs increase inversely.  There-
fore, there should be limits to the duration of explicit promises that a govern-
ment can attach to TDRs.  A government should be able to make an explicit
precommitment not to rezone the receiving area for a limited period of time,
but it should not be enforceable indefinitely.  A rezoning that undermines
the value of TDRs shortly after their issuance looks much more like an inter-
ference with reasonable expectations than a rezoning after many decades.
Midtown Ventures’ complaint would have looked very different in 1980 than
it does today.
VI. CONSEQUENCES FOR PROPERTY THEORY
The dynamic relationship between the costs and benefits of government
precommitments implicates more than TDRs.  This new Grand Central litiga-
tion provides a useful lens for identifying broader themes about regulatory
property and property more generally.  Stepping back from the narrow con-
text of TDRs, the fundamental issue is whether and to what extent regulatory
regimes can give rise to protectable property rights.
Since the 1960s, when Charles Reich published his important article,
The New Property,118 scholars and courts have recognized that regulatory enti-
tlements like welfare should receive due process protection before they can
be taken away.119  In more recent years, scholars have recognized a broad
category of regulatory property that includes such government grants as taxi
116 See Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land
Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307 (2013) (describing the history of zoning
development).
117 See supra Part IV.
118 Reich, supra note 17, at 785. R
119 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring procedural due process
protections before the state can remove public entitlements); see also Harry W. Jones, The
Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (1958) (arguing for new
rights); Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obliga-
tion to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 522 & n.13 (1996) (reviewing literature).
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medallions, grazing permits on federal land, pollution credits, and so
forth.120
There is no doubt that regulatory regimes can create rights that are pro-
tectable property for at least some purposes.  As Professor Katrina Wyman
has described in detail, taxi medallions have many of the indicia of private
property.121  They give holders the right to exclude others from using the
medallion; they are transferable, can be used as collateral for loans, and are
generally viewed as valuable assets.122  But property rights are contextual;
rights good against one person may not be good against another.123  Regula-
tory property is uniquely within the control of the government.  Its existence
and the scope of its protection is defined by the regulatory regime that cre-
ates it.  Pollution credits have value only because of the regulatory framework
that creates them.  Grazing rights give access to public resources that would
not otherwise be available for private use.  The government therefore has
broad power to alter and even to eliminate such regulatory property.
This is not unfettered power.  Government actions affecting regulatory
property are subject to some important legal constraints.  Where the prop-
erty is the product of explicit regulation, changes to the regulatory regime
are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, or to its state analogue.124
A government therefore cannot act arbitrarily and capriciously to remove or
alter regulatory property, and must provide adequate notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard.  These administrative rules are backstopped by constitu-
tional due process protections, both procedural and substantive.125  It is
therefore no surprise that courts have extended due process protection to
taxi medallions and to other forms of regulatory property.126
Takings protection is another matter, however.  The Takings Clause,
after all, protects only the reasonable expectations of property owners.127
And, at least as a general matter, people should expect legal and administra-
tive rules to change.  The legal system is fluid, and legal change is the norm
not the exception.  Pick almost any field and the evolution of policy prefer-
120 See Eagle, supra note 10, at 1; Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The R
Case of New York Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2013) (discussing taxi medal-
lions as property); Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129–30
(2001) (identifying “regulatory property”); supra note 18 and accompanying text (includ-
ing pollution credits as an example of regulatory property).
121 Wyman, supra note 120, at 135–39.
122 Id.
123 The law of finders is a classic example, giving finders rights against successive but
not prior possessors. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 49–52 (2013)
(surveying the law of finders).
124 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/
open_gov/Administrative-Procedure-Act.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
125 See, e.g., Reich, supra note 17 (discussing constitutional protection for regulatory
property).
126 See Wyman, supra note 120, at 137.
127 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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ences will be starkly apparent.  The most obvious may be environmental laws,
where new science—whether about climate change or carcinogens—recon-
figures substantive views about appropriate emissions.128  Simultaneously,
technological advances can expand the range of regulatory options, leading
to requirements to adopt new technologies, or to move to performance stan-
dards to accommodate the rate of change.129  But that same dynamism in
legal and regulatory approaches is ubiquitous, whether in food and drug law
with a new focus on genetic engineering, in extraction industries with the
rise of hydrofracking, in transportation safety, data privacy, and so on.130
Law’s dynamic nature is particularly evident in land use regulation.  As
consumer preferences change, zoning ordinances shift from protecting sin-
gle-family neighborhoods to accommodating mixed-use zones; from a focus
on permissible uses to form-based codes; from cul-de-sac to transit-oriented
development, to name just a few.131  In the face of sea level rise, municipali-
ties are increasing setbacks from the ocean, modifying height requirements,
changing building standards, and rethinking entire development patterns.132
These are often fast-moving changes.  It would be unreasonable for a prop-
erty owner on the beach today to expect to be able to build indiscriminately
in the future.  The only certainty now is that change is coming, and regula-
tory restrictions will look different relatively soon.  Indeed, I have argued that
a government’s failure to change the law in the face of ecological change
may itself be a taking of private property.133
This is not to say that the law is like quicksand with no secure purchase.
Often, politics and the inertia of the political process create a kind of de
facto stability that even appears to rise to the level of robust property rights.
Professor Wyman, in her discussion of taxi medallions, documented in politi-
128 See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 193, 202–03 (1996) (describing the effect of new scientific understanding on regu-
lation).  But see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U.
L. REV. 21, 31 (2001) (criticizing current regulations for failing to incorporate cutting-edge
science).
129 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic
Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25 (2011) (“A best available technol-
ogy standard may work much better for emissions than aiming for particular historic levels
achieved by what surely is no longer the best available technology.”).
130 See, e.g., John R. Nolon & Victoria Polidoro, Hydrofracking: Disturbances Both Geologi-
cal and Political: Who Decides?, 44 URB. LAW. 507, 512 (2012) (describing legal responses to
hydrofracking); Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State Enactments Por-
tend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN ST. L. Rev. 789, 799–806 (2014) (surveying state
labeling laws in response to GMOs); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the
Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008) (discussing impact of new technology on
Fourth Amendment law).
131 See, e.g., Serkin & Wellington, supra note 75, at 1685 (describing changes in modern
zoning).
132 See Edna Sussman et al., Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress Through Law and
Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 67 (2010) (describing zoning changes for climate
change adaptation).
133 See Serkin, supra note 63.
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cal terms the transformation of regulatory permission into full-fledged prop-
erty.134  In her account, taxi owners can rely on medallions as property
entitlements because they have persisted for so long, and the politics support-
ing them appears so strong.135  At least implicitly in this account, property
arises through the political fact of being able to rely on the stability of the
regulatory regime into the future.  Property, in this view, amounts to a kind
of prophetic legal realism—property consists of what people think it will be
in the future, and if change is not anticipated, then stable property is the
result.
Of course, politics alone is no guarantee of stability, as Professor
Wyman’s analysis unintentionally illustrates.  Today, with Uber, Lyft, and
other ride-sharing services rapidly proliferating, taxi medallions are suddenly
worth much less than they were just a few years ago.136  The power of the taxi
lobby has been unable to generate enough political opposition to regulate
Uber out of New York City, for example, and now the politics surrounding
the regulation of cabs in New York has been profoundly reconfigured.
But this example also demonstrates the importance of regulatory flexi-
bility.  Robust takings protection in this context would transform taxi medal-
lions into one-way ratchets.  Once property-like rights have been created, the
regulatory regime would become entrenched against subsequent changes,
even where the world has dramatically transformed in the interim.  That is
problematic from the perspective of entrenchment, but also defies the more
commonsense understanding that legal rules are and should be responsive to
changes in the world, whether technological, ecological, or societal.137
The idea here is straightforward: the more that the world diverges from
the expectations that gave rise to the regulatory property in the first place,
the more owners should expect some regulatory alteration.  Inevitably, then,
the longer a regime has been in place, the more people should expect it to
change.  This is not a positive prediction.  Plenty of outmoded rules and reg-
ulations remain on the books for political reasons or out of simple inatten-
tion.138  And people regularly bet on just such stability—as the example of
taxi medallions painfully illustrates, given actual events.  It is instead a norma-
tive claim about the reasonableness of people’s expectations.  People should
increasingly expect rules to change the more the world turns.
This is not as obvious as I hope that it seems.  There is a strong counter-
vailing intuition that the longer a rule or regulation has been in effect, the
134 See Wyman, supra note 120, at 156–67.
135 Id. at 139–40.
136 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Uber’s Rise Presses Taxi Lenders, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-rise-presses-taxi-lenders-1445471757.
137 See Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 440, 443 (2011)
(arguing that people enjoy a morale benefit when government appropriately responds to
problems, which should be counted against the “demoralization costs” that are more typi-
cal of takings analysis).
138 Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 18–19 (1982)
(describing outmoded and outdated laws).
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more reasonable the expectation that it will remain in place longer.  Indeed,
as a positive and psychological claim, this latter intuition hews closer to the
truth.  Grazing permits and rights to minerals on federal land are viewed,
increasingly, as inviolable because they have persisted for so long.139  Like-
wise, flood insurance and FEMA’s responses to flooding have worked their
way into people’s background expectations about flood-prone property, and
efforts to modernize the approach are stubbornly resisted.140
The descriptive accuracy of this psychological account actually reinforces
the importance of the contrary normative one.  Longstanding rules are
already very difficult to change precisely because of a strong status quo bias.
Holders of regulatory property often constitute discrete groups with a strong
interest in preserving their entitlements.  This is a recipe for disproportion-
ate political influence.141  The resulting pressure is already sufficiently strong
that it does not need to be reinforced by takings protection.
This is partly the lesson of the Grand Central TDRs.  It was important for
property owners to rely on their stability, at least initially and even for some
extended period.  But as more time passes, the costs of stability increase.  For
TDRs, as with all regulatory property, there comes a predictable point when
the interests of the issuing government are outweighed by the needs of the
present.  In property terms, government precommitments amortize slowly
over time, and eventually give way to new policies and priorities, the Takings
Clause notwithstanding.142
Whether or not this same analysis applies to more traditional forms of
private property depends on one’s underlying theoretical commitments to
positivism as opposed to natural rights or other conceptions of property.143
Positivists—and I count myself in this camp—will have trouble distinguishing
139 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier:
Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 257, 259 (2007)
(“Once an allocation rule is established, it becomes very difficult politically to modify.”).
140 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle Logue, The Unintended Effects of Government-Subsi-
dized Weather Insurance, 38 REGULATION, Fall 2015, at 24, 26 (describing recent efforts to
reform flood insurance).
141 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 37 (1991) (predicting that “small groups with concentrated (high per
capita) interests in lawmaking will come closer to their optimal level of petitioning than
large groups with diffuse (low per capita) interests” (first citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 28, 32–33, 35–36 (2d ed. 1971); and then citing Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212–13 (1976))); Amnon
Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1719 (2007)
(“[Public choice theory] points to the disproportionate influence that special interest
groups, and chiefly politically powerful real estate entrepreneurs, have over governmental
decisions in land policy issues.”).
142 See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222, 1235 (2009) (discussing amortization rules).
143 Compare Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553,
572 (2012) (describing positivism), with Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural
Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1566–74 (2003) (describing different natural
rights approaches to property).
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regulatory property from other resources.  In our regulatory state, the con-
tent of all property is largely if not entirely determined by state positive
law.144  The rights and responsibilities attached to land are determined by
complex and overlapping rules and regulations.  From zoning to environ-
mental rules to common law doctrines, the content of rights is governed by
the state to an extent that becomes difficult to distinguish from regulatory
property like TDRs.  At the very least, the value of property can be affected
dramatically by regulatory changes.145  If owners should expect changes to
regulatory property over time, they should perhaps also expect changes to
the regulatory restrictions that apply to more traditional private property, as
well.
Those less predisposed to positivism will find more equivocal lessons
here for other forms of property.  Admittedly, the differences between regu-
latory property and more traditional types of property seem stark.  Regula-
tory property is created by the state.  The government is entirely responsible
for its existence, not to mention its content and value.  Remove the regula-
tory regime and nothing is left.  Traditional property is, at most, regulated by
the state.  Remove regulations of traditional private property and the owner
still has the house, the land, or whatever else the underlying resource might
be.  As a result, expectations about the persistence of property may well be
different than for regulatory property.  Property owners can and should rea-
sonably rely on the stability of the underlying resource itself.
Some of the most venerable accounts of property in the common law
view property’s stability as among its core benefits.  It creates a sphere of
ordered liberty, a space relatively free from government incursion where peo-
ple can arrange their affairs as they wish.146  For property to serve this func-
tion fully, owners must be able to rely on the fact that their investments today
will be theirs to reap to tomorrow.  This conception is less tolerant of change.
There are doctrinal consequences to these competing precommitments.
The most obvious are to be found in the Takings Clause.  In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,147 the Supreme Court held that a total wipeout of all
economically beneficial uses of property is a per se taking.  The Court, how-
ever, carved out one important exception: a regulation is not a taking if it is
consistent with background principles of property and nuisance law.148  The
intuition appears to be that if a regulation merely codifies expectations that
property owners should have had anyway—e.g., that they cannot use their
property in ways that rise to the level of a nuisance—then restrictions prohib-
iting those activities are not takings.  What counts as a background principle
depends in no small measure on one’s underlying conception of property.
144 See Bloom & Serkin, supra note 143, at 574.
145 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (identifying diminution in
value from over $3,000,000 to $200,000 as a result of environmental regulation).
146 See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
147 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
148 Id. at 1031.
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Positivists are much more willing to view regulatory restrictions as part of
the legal warp through which property expectations are woven.  Once a new
law or regulation is put into place, property owners are on notice that they
are subject to its restrictions.149  Those rules then become part of the back-
ground principles of property to which new owners—and even existing
ones150—are subject, and takings liability will not attach.  Natural rights theo-
rists, however, will judge new regulations against some largely immutable
core of property.  Whether a regulation is longstanding or of recent vintage,
if it cuts too deeply into the core of property, it is a taking.
This is not the proper forum for defending one approach over another.
It is enough to see that expectations around legal change implicate the con-
tent of traditional property in addition to regulatory property.  If one
assumes that change and transformation are inherent in the content of prop-
erty—like positivists, for example, who view the content of property as inher-
ently political—then owners hold their property subject to this background
expectation of change.  As a result, new regulatory enactments are much less
likely to interfere with reasonable expectations, and so are much less likely to
rise to the level of a taking.  For present purposes, though, the point is simply
this: the tension between flexibility and stability, between entrenchment and
change, is not limited to regulatory property.  The issues presented by the
Grand Central TDRs implicate the very nature of property itself.
CONCLUSION
The recent litigation involving the Penn Central TDRs makes for a fasci-
nating postscript to the leading regulatory takings decision.  Even though the
case settled before trial, the fact of the litigation implicates the viability of
TDRs going forward.  If governments are free to undermine TDRs’ value,
then property owners will be reluctant to accept them and courts will be less
likely to view them as a meaningful exchange for regulatory burdens.  But if
the existence of TDRs locks in existing land use regulations then they
become both costly and problematically entrenching.  This Article has pro-
posed a straightforward solution.  By requiring a clear statement before TDRs
are entrenched, and then limiting the duration of that effect, it is possible to
balance the competing needs of reliance and flexibility.
This suggestion not only preserves the value of TDR programs for the
future, it also highlights an inherent dynamic of regulatory property where
the value of stability is offset against the loss of flexibility into the future.  It is
unreasonable for owners of regulatory property to expect that the law will be
static indefinitely in a changing world.  Past a certain point, the Takings
Clause should not inhibit regulatory change.
149 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1597, 1661 (2008) (“The issue of the mechanism through which state restrictions
on property become background principles essentially recapitulates the question of prop-
erty as a pre- or post-political institution.”).
150 See generally Serkin, supra note 142.
